



Reactivity in Social Scientific experiments:  What is it and 







Reactivity, or the phenomenon by which subjects tend to modify their behavior in virtue of their being 
studied upon, is often cited as one of the most important difficulties involved in social scientific 
experiments, and yet, there is to date a persistent conceptual muddle when dealing with the many 
dimensions of reactivity. This paper offers a conceptual framework for reactivity that draws on an 
interventionist approach to causality. The framework allows us to offer an unambiguous definition of 
reactivity and distinguishes it from placebo effects. Further, it allows us to distinguish between benign 
and malignant forms of the phenomenon, depending on whether reactivity constitutes a danger to the 






The surge in social scientific experimentation of the last years has been in great part driven by the success 
of experimental and behavioral economics. It is natural then that the methodological discussions around 
new experimental practices in the social sciences have often been shaped by the debates that were taking 
place among practicing experimental economists.  
 
In the first few decades after the emergence of new experimental practices in the social sciences, then, the 
question of reactivity, or the phenomenon that occurs when individuals alter their behavior because of 
their awareness of being studied, has not been central to the discussions of methodologists or 
practitioners, partly because economists were not crucially concerned by it.  
 
With their clear-cut methodological stance shaped most importantly by a tenacious control over the 
incentives faced by participants in the experimental setting, experimental economists may have initially 
felt that their experiments were shielded from the worries associated with subjects’ reactivity that had 
long haunted their fellow social psychologist  experimenters. More recently, experimental economists 
gradually moved in their study toward topics in which economic incentives no longer dominated the 
structure of a given game, but instead were intermingled with normative considerations (such as in the 
study of altruism, punishment, or social norms). Following this developments, a corresponding interest in 
the problem of reactivity has ensued among experimental economists. 
--------------------------------- 
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In particular, the question of reactivity, under its multiple conceptual variants, has gained the attention of 
important experimentalists regarding the Dictator Game (DG)1 and other similarly abstract designs aimed 
at measuring the normative inclinations of subjects. While the standard DG results, in which a number of 
“dictators” share their money with complete strangers has traditionally been interpreted widely as 
evidence of prosocial behavior, a number of important works that came out around the same time started 
disputing this interpretation, and instead suggested that the high level of donations observed was more 
likely indicative of the existence of artefacts: thus, for authors such as Bardsley (2008), Zizzo (2010), 
Dana et al (2007), and List (2007), the fact that a majority of DG subjects were willing to share a 
significant amount of their endowments with their fellow players was because the game was too 
transparently "about giving", and thus experimental subjects could easily guess what was expected of 
them and acted accordingly.  .  
 
In this way, and according to critics, players in the DG are merely trying to perform the role of “good 
subjects” by adjusting their behavior to expectations, or, more specifically, adjusting to what they think it 
is expected of them as subjects (Bardsley 2008, Zizzo 2010). Alternatively, others have argued that 
relevant inferences from the DG and other similarly abstract games are still possible: both in the lab and 
in the field, subjects' behavior depends on other people's expectations and thus the DG provides a useful 
setting to study how subjects choose to adhere to the normative cues that the experimental setting 
provides (Levitt and List 2011, Jiménez-Buedo and Guala, 2016). 
 
Despite the shadow of the artifact over the DG, the game continues to be enacted in the growing number 
of social science experimental labs that have been set up in the last few years, coinciding with the 
extraordinary growth of experimental methods across the social scientific disciplines.  There remains an 
open question regarding what can be inferred, if anything, from subjects’ behavior in the standard DG or 
its variants.  Can the DG results be used to explain phenomena outside the lab, and if so, which are those 
phenomena? Can we use the DG results to explain why people do things like give money to charities or is 
the behavior of DG players only meaningful (and relevant) inside the lab? 
This paper argues that the debate about the validity of results of the DG and related games is stymied by 
the ambiguities that surround the concept of reactivity, as there are a number of unresolved conceptual 
issues regarding the phenomenon of reactivity. In this paper, we address two of these conceptual 
ambiguities. 
 
First, there are a number of terms that are used to refer to what we here conceptualize as the phenomenon 
of reactivity, though they often are used without clarifying their definitions and, more importantly, they 
are often used interchangeably. In this way, Hawthorne effects, placebo effects, demand effects of 
experimentation, experimenter demand effects, methodological artifact, social desirability bias, are all 
terms that are often used in a loose way to invoke what we refer to as reactivity, or the phenomenon by 
which subjects in an experiment tend to modify their behavior in virtue of their awareness of being under 
study.  
 
For example, and as we will see again in the next section, this is apparent in the debate around the validity 
of inferences from the DG, where an array of terms have been used often interchangeably to refer, in turn, 
to an array of ambiguously defined phenomena related to reactivity. In this way, and though there are 
many possible mechanisms for what we here call reactivity (such as the desire of subjects to comply with 
experimenter's expectations; their capacity to correctly guess the object of the experiment; the queasiness 
or apprehension of subjects to being evaluated; the fact that some subjects may try to deceive 
experimenters about their true motives for action; and the fact that experimenters or experimental designs 
may involuntarily give out cues about what behavior is expected of subjects), we here try to provide a 




Second, and relatedly, there is the issue of whether the type of phenomena or mechanisms mentioned 
above invalidate an experiment’s inferential import or whether instead, they only constitute a potential 
 
1 In the DG, the experimenter allocates some fixed quantity of money with player 1, the Dictator, who 
then has to decide how much, if any, he or she wants to share with player 2, the Respondent. The results 
of the standard DG show that roughly half of the Dictators depart from the earnings maximizing strategy 
and choose to give some money, the mean allocation being 20% of the initial endowment. Moreover, a 
consistent minority of dictators choose to split the sum in two similar sizes (Camerer, 2003). 
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threat to the validity of inferences from an experiment. Again, because the definitions of terms such as 
Hawthorne effects, demand effects, and the like are often used without being standardized or 
operationalized, these terms are used interchangeably both to define the phenomenon associated with  
reactivity and to refer to the invalidation of an experiment’s results due to the existence of reactive 
effects. This, again, creates confusion around the validity of experiments whenever we know or suspect 
that reactivity is at work in any given experiment. Here, we provide a framework in which we specify the 
conditions under which the existence of reactivity poses a threat to our capacity to draw causal 
conclusions from experiments.  
 
In the pages that follow we provide a behavioral definition of reactivity.  We offer an interventionist 
framework (Woodward 2003) that subsumes the phenomena associated with reactivity under a unifying 
conceptual scheme.. This framework allows us both to define unambiguously the notion of reactivity, and 
to analyse  the challenges that reactivity can pose to causal inference in experiments with humans2. To 
this avail, we introduce a distinction between malignant and benign forms of reactivity, in terms of the 
effects that reactivity can have on the validity of causal inferences drawn from experimental results. We 
argue that malignant forms of reactivity have the potential to  render findings  causally uninterpretable 
and we have reason to suspect that they do so whenever the effects of reactivity are idiosyncratic, i.e., 
whenever reactive effects cannot be assumed to be equal across the control and the treatment groups. 
Finally, our framework allows us to differentiate between reactivity and placebo effects. 
 
Our paper also argues that clarifying this concept and the related set of phenomena that it describes 




2. Reactivity Again 
 
In the early years of the experimental economics, when the focus was exclusively on the study of market 
institutions, experimental economists may have felt that their experiments were shielded from the worries 
associated with subjects’ reactivity. This was due partly to the fact that experimental economics, born as a 
means to study the economic phenomena such as the clearing of markets, could adhere to a series of 
methodological principles, synthesized by Vernon Smith’s precepts (Smith 1982)3, and meant as a list of 
rules that provided sufficient conditions for the validity of experiments. Of these six principles, four of 
them were related to the need of adherence to strictly structured monetary incentives. Most importantly, 
the principle of dominance dictated that  incentives had to dominate over any other subjective costs 
associated with participation in the experiment, thus creating a stark methodological barrier between the 
practices of economists and other more traditional experimental practices in psychology.  
 
Gradually, the practices of experimental economists converged with those of behavioral economists (who 
themselves had a history of cross-collaboration with psychologists) and this convergence crystallized in a 
methodological synthesis in which there was a clear relaxation of some of the Smithian precepts. Yet, 
there was still the perception that economists and psychologists differed systematically in their 
methodological practices, as summarized in the classic Hertwig and Ortmann piece(2001). Following 
Hertwig and Ortmann, these practices (the proscription of deception, the use of well-defined scripts, and 
the repetition of tasks), together with the use of monetary incentives, were defining features of the 
 
2 It is perhaps opportune to underline once more that the framework for reactivity we provide, 
in which it is used as an umbrella term, does not intend to distinguish among different 
mechanisms of reactivity. It instead unifies the phenomenon in order to explore the problems 
that it can create to causal identification and experimental validity. 
3 Vernon Smith’s precepts were the following: the proscription of deception, the principle of parallelism, 
or the idea of “similarity” between the lab setting and the target phenomena, and finally, a series of 
requirements regarding the structure of the incentives faced by subjects. These included: (i)nonsatiation 
(where the medium of payment should not “satiate” participants, in the way, more money does typically 
not satiate); (ii) saliency (where the reward must increase or decrease according to the way in which an 
outcome is consider good or bad, or correct or incorrect); (iii) dominance (where the rewards  must 
dominate any subjective costs associated with participation in the experiment), and (iv)privacy (in that 




experiments in economics, as compared to those of psychologists. None of these practices were in 
themselves warrants against reactivity but they may have, collectively, during some years, given a sense 
of protection against the perils of reactivity to a profession that was gradually and increasingly adopting 
experimental practices.   
 
 
As experiments became common within the discipline of economics, experimenters in economics 
broadened the array of topics that they dealt with. Gradually their topics included, prominently, questions 
regarding pro-social behavior, but in these games, by construction, monetary incentives needed to be 
weighed against other (pro-social) considerations: they could no longer completely dominate the 
incentives of the players (Jiménez-Buedo, 2015).  Against this background, and as we already pointed out 
in the introduction, the success of games such as the DG and the ensuing debate over the correct 
interpretation of its results eventually brought the question of reactivity to the fore of the methodological 
discussion among economists.  
 
Initially, the critics of standard interpretations of the Dictator Game results resorted to standard 
terminology used in more traditionally experimental disciplines, such as psychology. For example, as 
already mentioned above, Bardsley (2008) resorted to the concept of Hawthorne effects in his criticism of 
altruistic interpretations of the DG results. The term of Hawthorne effects, with origins in industrial 
organizational studies, is normally used to refer to the fact that subjects may try to “overperform” when 
they are being observed4. Because its definition is not standardized, it is also often used to refer to the 
subject’s sensivity to being observed and sometimes also to refer to the behavioral changes that are 
considered to be a direct response to the experimenter’s scrutiny.  
 
Among the DG critics, Zizzo (2010) provides his own conceptual approach to the issue, and coined what 
is now the standard terminology in economics. Zizzo defined experimenter demand effects (2010) as the 
changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior. 
According to Zizzo, experimenter demand effects can be either purely cognitive (when an experimental 
participant tries to figure out what she is expected to do as an experimental subject), or they can also have 
an additional social layer, when that elucidation is additionally shaped by a sense of social adequateness.  
Moreover, Zizzo’s conceptual scheme also provided an account of the way in which experimenter 
demand effects could affect the validity of experiments. According to his framework experimenter 
demand effects are a problem for  the validity of experiments whenever experimental participants can 
correctly guess the true experimental objectives.  
 
 
The term experimenter demand effects has been very extremely influential among experimental 
economists, and due to the influence of economics in the new wave of social science experimentalism, it 
is already permeating the language of experimentalists in other social sciences, such as sociology and 
political science, thus constituting the new conceptual standard. The term experimenter demand effects 
constitutes in itself a sort of terminological synthesis with respect to preexisting terms in social 
psychology,  by merging two classic terms: experimenter effects, and demand effects of experimentation. 
These other two terms constituted two important tenets in the lingo that originated in social psychology in 
the 1960s and 1970s and that has conformed, for years, the vocabulary of social scientific 
experimentalists: the synthesis would come from merging together, in one term, Orne’s demand 
characteristics of experimentation and Rosenthal’s experimenter (expectancy) effects. In the case of the 
former, Orne (1962, 1969) studied, both theoretically and empirically, how experimental subjects actively 
contribute to complete and construe the experimental task by enquiring and hypothesizing what is 
expected of them as experimental subjects. For Orne, this is an inherent feature of social scientific 
experimentation, since experimental instructions are necessarily incomplete:  the experiment is itself a 
social situation that exerts implicit demands on the social actors involved in it. These implicit demands 
are worthy of study by social psychologists (thus, Orne’s project of a Social Psychology of 
Experimentation). More practically, Orne also considered that these demands need to be analyzed by 
experimenters because they have the potential to interfere with the (more explicit) experimental task that 
is the experimentalist’s primary object of research. Rosenthal’s experimenter expectancy effects (1968), 
 
4 The origin of the term comes from the Hawthorne Works, in Illinois, a factory in which, in the context 
of a series of studies on productivity,  a group of assembly employees seemed to paradoxically increase 
their productivity as researchers dimmed the lights. This puzzling result was interpreted as the result of 
the perception of workers of being under study (Adair, 1984).  
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in turn, refer to the set of cues regarding the experiment’s objectives or hypotheses that experimenters can 
inadvertently send to participants,  and that can end up affecting the experiment’s results. In this way, and 
by focusing on experimenter demand effects, Zizzo merges both of these traditions in how he 
conceptualizes these effects: these are changes in the behavior of experimental subjecs due to 
(experimenter) cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior (“demanded” from them). 
 
Zizzo classifies demand effects on the basis of whether subjects correctly 
or incorrectly guess the true goal of the experiment. Thus, depending on the 
coincidence between what the subjects believe about the experiment and 
what the experiment really is meant to test, we have three possible cases: 
1. Uncorrelated expected and true objectives 
2. Negatively correlated expected and true objectives 
3. Positively correlated expected and true objectives 
 
Zizzo argues that only the third case is truly problematic: demand effects in this case act as a confound, 
preventing the researcher from distinguishing the causal role of the treatment from that of the demand. 
This is, according to him,  the case of the standard Dictator Game: the experimenter’s demand is 
correlated with the true purpose of the experiment, because subjects can easily guess that the experiment 
is about “giving.” Zizzo’s terminological effort is commendable, among other things, for trying to offer 
an account of the conditions under which experimenter demand effects affect the validity of experiments. 
But Zizzo’s specification remains unsatisfactory for the reasons discussed below.  
 
A look at some standard practices in the more orthodox practices of experimental economics suffices in 
order to see why Zizzo’s diagnosis regarding the effects of experimental demand effects on validity lacks 
generality: monetary incentives (especially when or if they are dominant) are often used, precisely, to 
align the motivation of experimental subject with the (true) objectives of experimenters in a given game. 
In other words, they are used to signal to participants what the real objectives of a given experiment are. 
This is the case, for example, in those instances in which experimenters create an environment where 
income maximization is expected and demanded from participants. The coincidence between the true 
experimental objectives and those guessed by participants is in these cases, rather than a problem, a 
precondition for success in the experiment. This is a weakness  in Zizzo’s diagnosis regarding the relation 
between reactivity and the validity of experiments. 
 
The interventionist account that we introduce next avoids this problem by bypassing any reference to the 
“experiment’s true objectives“, a notion that can be vague and hard to operationalize. Yet, our account 
still provides a way to distinguish between situations in which reactivity is not problematic for 
experimental validity versus situations in which it potentially poses a threat. As we mentioned in the 
introduction, to properly discern between these two situations is important terminologically, as this is one 
of the ambiguities that hinders discussions on reactivity by producing misunderstandings: most of the 
terms that we use to refer to the general phenomenon of reacitivity  (such as experimenter effects, demand 
effects, placebo effects, Hawthorne effects, or methodological artifacts) are often used without 
distinguishing between two different aspects of the phenomenon: these terms are used to refer both to the 
mechanisms that have the potential to bias an experiment and to the biases that can (or not) result from 
these mechanisms.  
 
As we have already mentioned, some of the terms that are normally linked to reactivity-related 
phenomena have, in some contexts, some more specific meanings. This is the case, for example, for the 
term Hawthorne effects, which in some contexts can refer to the fact that experimental participants often 
feel motivated to display their best performance at a given task (and in this sense, better than they would 
under normal conditions), as a result of their being under study. Yet, in other contexts (as was the case in 
the DG debate), the term is also used in a different sense, to refer to the participants’ motivation to adapt 
their behavior to whatever they think the experimenter expects of them. While these two different types of 
attitudes can coincide in some contexts (e.g., whenever experimenters expect participants to perform at 
their “best” and subjects anticipate it), there are scenarios in which these two types of participant attitudes 
would lead to diverging behavioral responses5.  For this reason, using the same term to refer to both 
phenomena can lead to confusion.  
 
5 Note, as an example of how the two phenomena may differ in a concrete example: In the original  
Hawthorne Works study, employees responded by overperforming as lights became dimmer, though it is 




Here we defend an approach that unifies all reactivity-related phenomena under the same label, by 
focusing on the common aspects of the different mechanisms that can lead to reactivity. This does not 
preclude that further studies focus on more specific mechanisms, but rather, we contend that in an area 





3. Interventionism and Social Scientific Experiments 
 
In this section we characterize reactivity and the challenges that it poses to causal inference by using an 
interventionist or manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 
2000,[1993]). For this, we will first describe the basic tenets of causal interventionism to then 
characterize a common type of behavioral experiment using an interventionist framework. We then 
analyze the possible meanings of reactivity through an interventionist lens.  
 
An interventionist conception of causation conceives causal relationships as relationships that describe 
what will happen to some variables (effects, or dependent variables) when we manipulate or intervene on 
others (causes, or independent variables). For an interventionist to say that a relationship is causal is thus 
to say that it is exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control in a way that merely correlational 
relationships are not. The choice for this framework given our present problem (i.e., reactivity and how it 
affects causal inference from experimental data) seems natural for three reasons: 
 
First, the interventionist notion of cause is often justified, precisely, as one that is especially fitting to the 
logic of the controlled experiment, which in turn is regarded as a method privileged in its capacity to 
allow for the testing of causal claims (pp. 22-23 Woodward 2003). In fact, interventionism can also be 
interpreted as a methodology to find out about causes, rather than as an approach committed to any 
particular ontology of causation (see Woodward 2015). Understood as a methodology, interventionism 
associates causal claims with the outcomes of hypothetical  experiments in which the value of the variable 
representing the putative effect is set by means of intervening (only) on the putative cause.  
 
Second, interventionism as conceived by Woodward has been especially concerned with the identification 
and clarification of ambiguous causal claims as they come up in (often social) scientific contexts, such as 
the assertion that "being female causes one to be discriminated against in hiring/salary" (p. 115, 
Woodward 2003). Woodward has tried to clarify such claims by linking them to potential or actual 
experimental manipulations. As we will show, the ambiguity in some of the assertions involving the 
phenomenon of reactivity comes, precisely, from a lack of clarity regarding what types of manipulations 
are attainable in different experimental settings involving humans.  
 
Third, although Woodward has dealt with psychological and social science experiments that study social 
preferences (2007, 2008), the question of reactivity has not been systematically analysed under an 
interventionist framework: though Woodward has studied some well-known economic experiments such 
as the Ultimatum and the DG, his discussions have dealt with the robustness and external validity of their 
findings, but he has not, to date, specifically dealt with the phenomenon of reactivity and the question of 
how it can affect the causal claims we can validly infer from these games. The present paper thus 
contributes both to the literature on interventionism in social scientific experimentation and more broadly 
to the methodological and philosophical debates around experimental social science.  
 
According to Woodward’s well-known manipulationist definition of cause: 
 
(M) X causes Y iff (1) it is possible to intervene on X and (2) under some such possible intervention on 
X, changes in the value of X are associated with changes in the value of Y. Interventions must in turn 
fulfill the following conditions: 
 
IN-i The intervention I completely disrupts the causal relationship between X and its previous causes. The 





IN-ii The intervention I should not itself be produced by any process that affects Y via a route that does 
not go through X. 
IN-iii The intervention I leaves the values taken by any causes of X except those that are on the path from 
I to X to Y unchanged. 








In more recent work Woodward (2007) has relaxed condition IN-i, which defines hard or arrow-breaking 
interventions in order to accommodate processes in which the value of X does not come entirely under the 
control of the intervention. This happens when there are other endogenous causal influences on X that 
cannot be broken by the intervention. In those cases. IN-i can be relaxed to IN-i’, where the intervention 
supplies an appropriately exogenous and uncorrelated source of variation to the variable X intervened 
on, rather than a complete disruption or breaking of all other causal influences on X.  Thus, in soft 
interventions thus defined, the variation supplied by the intervention I should not be correlated with other 
causes of X or with causes of Y besides those that are on the route from I to X to Y.  
 
The relaxation of this condition is crucial to accommodate experiments in many areas in which proper 
surgical interventions are not possible. In the case of the behavioral sciences, the impossibility is often 
determined by the fact that some form of mental causation is involved: as it has been argued by Campbell 
(2007), condition IN-i would entail that whenever we want to intervene on the mental state of an agent, 
we must ensure the removal of all the other causes of that agent’s mental state (thus suspending the 
rational autonomy of the individual).  
 
Now that the main elements of an interventionist framework are laid out, we can use it to represent some 
economics experiments. In particular, we want to focus on the type of experiments that have sparked 
some of the recent discussions about reactivity in experimental economics. For this reason, we will use 
the DG as an example, as it is a well-known game with a very simple structure facilitating exposition, and 
has the additional advantage of having been extensively discussed by leading experimentalists in regard 
to reactivity-related issues. 
 
By introducing modifications to the basic structure of the game, The DG design has been used to test 
different types of hypotheses. Here we focus on a well-established use of the DG design: the testing of 
subjects’ sensitivity to the manipulation of the normative framework applicable to the experimental 
situation (Guala and Mittone, 2010). Typically, in this kind of experimental exercise the basic DG is 
played as a control against a modified DG that constitutes the treatment, where the modification consists 
of the introduction of a normative-relevant cue. For example, in a well-known example, subjects in the 
treatment group play the DG in a room in which a picture of a pair of eyes is set, in order to bring to the 
subjects’ imagination the possibility of someone observing their actions (Haley and Fessler (2005)). Other 
well-known modifications of the DG include introducing a modification in the identity of the Recipient 
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(from an anonymous player to a well-known NGO, for example), or introducing an element of merit in 
deciding who, among two given players, gets to be the Dictator.  
 
To be sure, both the standard DG (acting as a control or baseline) and the modified DG (acting as the 
treatment of interest) expose experimental subjects to an “unusual” normative setting, but the assumption 
is that by further modifying the normative environment, we can test whether an additional normative cue 
further affects the subject’s willingness to donate. The difference in the mean allocation between the two 
games is then interpreted as reflecting the impact of the introduction of the experimental manipulation in 
the modified DG: in terms of the causal hypothesis being tested, the difference in the mean allocation 
(from Dictators to Recipients) in the two experimental settings is seen as being caused by the introduction 
of the normative cue.  
 
We can thus conceptualize this experiment, in more formal terms, as one based on a double intervention, 
where we must compare the results of each intervention to draw a conclusion about the causal impact of 
our putative cause on the putative effect (or the impact of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable). For this, we compare a control group playing the standard DG (X0), with a treatment group 
exposed to the introduction of a DG that includes an additional normative cue (X1). The causal impact of 
the normative change in the environment (X1-X0) is thus measured by the difference in the mean 








We are now in a position to offer a suitable conceptualization of reactivity from an interventionist 
perspective. Recall that reactivity does not need to be restricted to experiments, as it is usually understood 
as the change in the subject’s behavior that results from his or her awareness of being studied, where this 
is also applicable to observational studies. In an observational environment, the change in behavior will 
come as a result of a subject´s awareness of being studied, or as a result of the operation of whatever 
measurement device is used. In the case of experimental studies there is an added layer of complexity, 
since by its own nature, the experiment provides the subject with a stimulus that is often supposed and 
expected to cause a behavioral change in participants (by exposing them to the treatment, or putative 
cause). Thus, when specifically applied to experiments, most definitions of reactivity-related phenomena 
can be seen as somewhat elliptical: reactivity is the change in the subject’s behavior as a direct result of 
her being studied, rather than as a result of the operation of our variable of interest, although the second 
part of the sentence is often not explicitly mentioned. 
 
In terms of the categories deployed in an interventionist scheme, reactivity can thus be defined as a 
byproduct of an experimental intervention due to the subject’s awareness of taking part in that 
 
6 The representacional convention (I=on and off ) is borrowed  from Eberhardt and Scheines (2007).  
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intervention. This byproduct takes place outside the causal path that goes from the independent variable 
or putative cause to the dependent variable or putative effect: we intervene on X (the putative cause) in 
order to assess its effect on Y (some aspect of the subject’s behavior), but by intervening  experimentally, 
we also affect the subject’s behavior via some other route that does not go through X (i.e., the subject´s 
behavior gets altered because of his or her awareness of being under study).  
 
Figures 3 and 4 represent cases of reactivity associated with experiments with settings akin to that of the 
DG: reactivity occurs when an intervention produces a change in the subject’s behavior through a route 















Let us illustrate this definition with our DG example, where an intervention introduces a normative cue in 
the environment in order to test for its causal effect on the subject’s “giving behavior”. Reactivity would 
occur if the intervention also results in inducing in the participant, for example, a sense of apprehension 
(such as a sensation of queasiness over feeling observed or studied upon) and if, in turn, the participant 
reacts to this apprehension by modifying his behavior (such as, for example, sitting up straight in his chair 
as a response to the feeling observed).  Note that the apprehension is not attributable to the introduction of 
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the normative cue per se, but to some other aspect imbued in the experimental setting, such as  the fact of 
being under observation (see figures 3 and 4 above).   It should be noted that apprehension to evaluation 
is only one of the many potential triggers of reactivity, where other common, well-known manifestations 
or mechanisms include the subjects’ reactions to the perceived authority of the experimenter, the 
participant’s zeal for being “a good subject” (or the opposite  uncooperative desire to “boycott” an 
experiment), or the pervasive and understandable participants’ active search for cues and second guesses 
about what the experiment is really about (Jiménez-Buedo and Guala, 2016).  
 
 
By conceptualizing the phenomenon of reactivity in this way, we can better see what distinguishes 
reactivity in an experimental context from the more encompassing, general phenomenon of reactivity in 
observational research. Reactivity occurs when by studying subjects, we modify their behavior. However, 
in an experimental context there is always an intended intervention on the subjects’ environment, often 
purposefully directed at behavioral change. Reactivity is thus the uncontrolled, unintended effect on the 
subjects’ behavior that results as a byproduct of the intervention put in place to test for the causal effects 
of the experimental treatment. As we will see in the next section, our interventionist framework allows us, 
precisely, to discern when and why the intervention’s behavioral byproduct poses risks to our capacity to 
draw causal inferences from the experimental data.  
 
 
4. Benign and malignant forms of Reactivity 
 
Now that we have defined reactive behavior within an interventionist framework, we can distinguish 
between two types of reactivity, depending on whether the type of reactive behavior violates or complies 
with the conditions for an ideal intervention.  
 
Benign reactivity occurs when the intervention’s impact on the subject’s behavior does not affect the 
output variable of interest in the  experiment. It is thus benign, in the sense that it does not pose in itself 
any problems to the causal inferential process as conceived by interventionism. Figures 4 and 5 show 
examples of benign reactivity: intervening to set the value of the putative cause triggers an additional 
behavioral effect (sitting up differently than we normally would). This effect, however, operates outside 
of the causal path going from X to Y, and does not affect Y in any way.  
 
By not violating any of the conditions of an ideal intervention, benign reactivity does not pose any 
particular challenges to causal inference. In our DG example, benign reactivity would mean that the 
apprehension that DG players can experience causes them to sit differently in their chairs (or makes them 
more prone to smiling, or causes their heart to beat faster) but to retain its benign character that same 
apprehension cannot affect the players’ “giving behavior”.  
 
We can define malignant reactivity, in contrast, as occurring when the experimental manipulation not 
only changes the value of the putative effect Y by setting in motion the putative cause X, but additionally, 
it gives rise to an additional causal path that also affects the output variable of interest Y. This violates 
condition IN-iii above, so manipulations in which malignant reactivity occurs do not constitute ideal 
interventions in the Woodwardian sense.  
 
Figure 3 represents graphically a case of malignant reactivity: the intervention sets in motion some 
reactive mechanism in Dictators (such as apprehension) and this apprehension affects, in turn, their 
willingness to donate to Recipients. In this case, the Dictator’s donating behavior is influenced  both by 
the manipulation of the normative framework and by the participants’ apprehension toward the 
experimental evaluation of their behavior (see Figure 3). Malignant reactivity thus constitutes an obstacle 
to causal inference through the violation of the IN-iii condition: if the level of donations we observe is 
suspected to be due not only to our introduction of a normative cue (the putative cause) but also 
influenced by some concomitant factor (in this case evaluation apprehension), then the effect that we 
observe on donations when we intervene on the normative cue cannot be attributed solely to it.  
 
Note that the introduction of the distinction between malignant and benign forms of reactivity solves an 
extant ambiguity in the way that the relevant literature treats the relation between reactivity and 
experimental validity: the many terms that are employed to refer to reactivity-related phenomena are 
normally used to designate both the phenomenon itself and its potential for undermining the validity of 
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experimental inferences. In this way, it is often the case that terms such as Hawthorne effects, are used 
ambiguously to refer both to the phenomenon by which a subject, for example, may be motivated to 
perform his or her best in an experimental context, and to refer to the experimental artifact that a 
particular reactive behavior may cause in a particular experiment. The problem with this ambiguity is that 
if it goes unnoticeds it implicitly amounts to assuming that any reactivity-related phenomenon ipso facto 
invalidates any experimental inference that we wish to make. Yet, the two need not go together, as we 
might well be in situations in which, for example, we want, as experimenters, to motivate participants to 
perform at their best level, having no reason to think that their doing so poses a problem to the validity of 
our inferences from the experiment.  
 
Because we also know that some form of reactivity or another is always present in any social scientific 
experiment, the implicit automatic connection between reactivity and artifact is likely to play no small 
role in the thinking of those that see social scientific experimentation as an enterprise doomed to fail. Yet, 
most social scientists and commentators tend to think, more plausibly, that reactivity does not 
irremediably lead to the invalidation of an experiment, yet the systematic discussion on the conditions 
under which it would are often absent.  
 
In this regard, Zizzo’s more ambitious conceptual project is careful on the matter: in his framework, 
experimenter demand effects are not in themselves a problem but have the potential to create one 
whenever experimental subjects can correctly guess the objectives of the experiment, yet, as Jiménez-
Buedo and Guala (2016) have argued, this approach neglects that often many economic experiments 
successfully align the incentives of subjects and experimenters through monetary rewards that are meant, 
precisely, to inform experimental subjects what exactly is sought of them, or in other words, what the 
objective of the experiment really is. Thus, and although Zizzo’s identification of this condition seems to 
fit the DG case nicely, it does not constitute the best grounds for a general elucidation of these conditions.    
 
Our definition of reactivity and our distinction between benign and malignant forms of reactivity solves 
this problem: reactivity can but does not necessarily cause problems for causal inference. In its benign 
form, reactivity does not in itself pose difficulties in terms of the causal inferences that we can draw from 
experiments. In contrast, malignant reactivity constitutes an obstacle to the inference of causality from 
experimental data.  
 
5. Is malignant reactivity lethal to causal inference? Placebo effects versus reactivity 
 
 
The previous section ends on a somber note regarding the damage that malignant reactivity can do to 
experimental exercises aimed at inferring the causal impact of a given variable through controlled 
interventions. Yet, the reader may immediately consider the parallels between malignant forms of 
reactivity and what routinely occurs in Randomized Controlled Trials when placebo effects are present. 
After all, the interventions that normally  take place in RCTs often include, via placebo effects, a 
violation of condition IN-iii: the placebo effect created by exposure to any treatment (active or placebo) 
can improve our mood or expectations in ways that in turn impact our health. Yet, as we know, the 
introduction of control groups routinely solves whatever problems this may create for causal inferential 
purposes.  
 
In fact, Woodward (2008) has discussed how an interventionist account can analytically deal with the 
presence of placebo effects in drug-testing RCTs. He has done so in the context of his response to 
Cartwright’s criticism of the interventionist’s assumption of modularity.  Woodward argues that even 
though, as Cartwright rightly points out, placebo effects make surgical interventions impossible, 
interventionism can account for the strategies employed for inferring causality despite the impossibility 
(2008, p. 212)). In the presence of the placebo effects  (i.e., expectations about treatment that have an 
effect on the recovery of patients) an intervenionist approach  provides the rationale for the introduction 
of a control group that receives a placebo (a drug that resembles the treatment in all but its active 
ingredient). The aim of this placebo control group is to provide a base-line that allows us to measure  the 
net causal effect of the drug we are testing by means of comparing the output result in the control trial and 
drug trials. The difference between the two trials is thus assumed to be an accurate representation of what 
would have happened if the drug had been administered in the absense of a placebo effect. In an 
interventionist account this subtraction or net effect represents or stands for the results of a counterfactual 
trial in which a surgical, ideal intervention would be possible. If the solution is readily available in the 
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B. Reactivity in Social Scientific Experiments: 
 
 
Figure 5 (A and B) 
 
In figure 5 we can see how the structure of the problem is formally similar in both the DG in the presence 
of reactivity and in an RCT with placebo effects. In both cases we see how malignant reactivity is present. 
However, there is a crucial difference between both situations:  whereas in the case of RCTs the 
assumption of equivalent placebo effects across treatments seems generally valid (or at least valid for all 
those experiments in which the treatment can be administered in ways where blinding is effective7, such 
as in the intake of pills), it seems much harder to satisfy in the case of treatments involving some form of 
mental causation.8  
 
The reason is that in the case of social scientific experiments, a given treatment (or placebo) needs to be 
embedded in an experimental script, to which subjects then react. In some ways the experimental script 
carries the variable of interest like a pill may carry (or not) an active treatment: the variable of interest 
(say, a normative cue) is embedded in a given script like an active principle is embedded in a pill. Yet, 
this “carrying” also differs in important ways: in the case of experimental treatments involving mental 
causation, the script that “carries” a given treatment also embodies it, in a way in which the script and the 
treatment in which it is embedded become an inseparable bundle to which the subject reacts. For this 
reason, whatever reactive behavior occurs, it is likely to be the joint product of all the experiment’s 
elements in conjunction and this, in turn, implies that each script has the potential to give rise to its own 
unique, idiosyncratic reactivity: even if the treatment and control protocols differ in only one element 
(i.e., the presence or absence of our intended independent variable of interest), we cannot rule out that this 
differential element is enough to alter the participants’ perception of the whole experimental experience. 
This means that even the part of the script that remains the same across treatments can be perceived 
differently (as part of a different whole) by the experimental subjects.  
 
7 For an analysis on the relevance of blinding see Teira (2013, 2019).. 
8 To be sure, placebo effects also, and rather obviously, involve mental causation, but on this 
point we are contrasting the treatments that are being administered, not the secondary effects 
(both of which -placebo and reactivity alike- involve mental causation). In the case of the social 
sciences treatments, they will almost always involve some form of mental causation, in contrast 





When we add an active principle to a pill in the control group, the active principle alone can explain the 
difference between the responses in the treatment and control groups. In contrast, when we add (for 
example) an additional normative cue to an experimental script, the difference between the respones in 
the treatment and control group is the result of the interaction of the normative cue with the script. Put in 
other words, the inclusion of an element whose causal impact we want to test (e.g., a normative cue) has 
the potential to modify the effect of the same base script across the experimental groups, since the 
normative cue and the script that embeds it will be received inseparably by the experimental subjects. The 
same script used on its own (in the control group), and used in conjunction with the treatment (in the 
treatment group), might be received differently. This stands in contrast with the case of an RCT testing 
the efficacy of an active ingredient: once we assume that blinding across treatments is effective, we can 
safely assume that the excipient in the pill has the same (placebo) effect across the treatment and the 
control groups.  
 
In social scientific experiments, when a design tries to isolate the causal effect of a treatment embedded in 
a script, we must however at least conceive of the possibility (in cases where we suspect that there is 
malignant reactivity) that the differences in behavior across groups may be due not only to the treatment 
itself (understood here again as the variable of interest) but also, that this difference across treatments 
may be also due to the differences (across treatments) in the reactive behavior. This means that even if we 
introduce a minute change in the treatment group (minute with respect to the control group), we may also 
be modifying differentially across treatments, things like the participant´s eargerness to cooperate with 
what she thinks is the experiment’s objective, or her apprehension to the experimenter’s evaluation.  
 
The reason for this lies in the holistic nature of meaning in social interactions: because any minute 
difference in a script has the potential to alter the meaning of a social interaction, a small difference in a 
script can transform the subjects’ interpretation of the experiment and thus can change the reactive 
behavior associated with it.  
 
This has an important implication for social scientific experiments aiming at testing  causal hypotheses 
through the comparison of control and treatment groups: if we cannot assume generally that these two 
interventions give rise to the same type of reactivity, then we cannot assume generally that a standard 
control group will suffice in order to correctly identify and isolate the causal impact of treatments net of 
reactivity.. This will be the case even i ( as it is often the case), the control and the treatment differ in only 
one minute element, for that minute element has the potential to change the interpretation of the whole 
experiment and to induce different types of reactivity in both the control and the treatment groups. As we 
have shown, this aspect of social scientific experimentation can be well represented and conceptualized 
through an interventionist framework.  
 
This paper thus clarifies the phenomenon of reactivity by subsuming it under this well-known framework. 
An interventionist framework allows us to provide a behavioral definition of the phenomenon of 
reactivity, subsuming its different mechanisms under a general scheme. It allows us, further, to 
distinguish between benign and malignant forms of reactivity, by differentiating between situations in 
which reactivity affects the variable of interest, from those in which the reactive behavior is orthogonal to 
the variable of interest.  
 
In this section we have also seen how an interventionist framework can allow us to differentiate between 
situations in which malignant reactivity can be remedied with a control group (as it is routinely the case in 
RCTs dealing with placebo effects), from those situations in which malignant reactivity may be 
“resistant” to the standard procedure of contrasting the treatment and control groups. The latter can 
happen whenever reactivity may be idyosincratic, meaning that it is unique to the particular script enacted 
in each experiment. If reactivity is of this type, it cannot be subtracted away by comparing the treatment 
and the control group, even if the treatment and control differ in only one element. Summing up, an 
interventionist framework thus allows us to show that experimental reactivity can pose a threat to the 
inferential import of experiments. According to this framework this will happen in cases in which this 
reactivity is both malignant and idiosyncratic.  
 
An interventionist framework thus provides a clear account of cases in which reactivity is present, but 
benign to the validity of an experiment, and it further provides a clear account of situations in which, in 
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contrast, reactivity poses a threat to validity even if we have a (placebo) control group9. This contrasts 
with  previous analysis of some aspects of the phenomena, and especially, with Zizzo’s account of 
experimenter demand effects, in which they are supposedly a threat to validity in cases in which 
experimental subjects can correctly identify the true objectives of the experiment.  
 
 
Let us illustrate this analysis with our example contrasting the  use of placebo in a properly blinded RCT 
with the case of a DG in which we assume malignant idiosyncratic reactivity (examples also depicted in 
figure 5): 
 
If in an RCT set up to test the effectiveness of a new drug a given participant’s mood is improved merely 
by taking part in the study (i.e., if he or she is subject to a placebo effect), then we can safely assume that 
this improvement in mood will be equivalent across the treatment and control groups, in so far as blinding 
of the treatment is effective. 
 
In contrast, consider the case of a standard DG used as a control and a modified DG used as the treatment 
of interest. If a participant is feeling apprehensive regarding the scrutiny of her behavior in a standard 
DG, this apprehension will be linked to her interpretation of the experiment’s meaning, which in turn will 
be determined jointly by her overall experience as a participant, i.e., by all the elements consisting of the 
experimental setting. In the standard DG subjects might feel queasiness regarding the fact that the 
standard DG is a “mysterious”, or an unusual game, where it is not totally clear what sort of behavior is 
expected of them. If we add an additional stimulus to the game in a modified DG (such as, for example, 
revealing the identity of the Recipient as being a charitable organization) we may, as experimenters,  be 
using this stimulus as the carrier of a normative cue, the effects of which we want to test. However, the 
stimulus will also be the likely carrier of its own particular form of reactivity, one that has the potential to 
differ systematically from the type of reactivity associated with  a standard DG. A modified DG can 
perhaps provide clearer signals to participants about the normative expectations at play, thus turning the 
environment into a more familiar one. At the same time, however, the range of phenomena linked to 
reactivity, (i.e., the behavioral response that is due to elements other than the intended treatment) is also 
likely to differ from that of a standard DG, and might, for example, have more to do with uncontrolled 
expectations regarding how to appear as a good subject.   
 
In other words, to the extent that any two treatments involving social interactions are different (e.g., the 
baseline and the treatment of interest) we can expect (or at least consider the possibility) that their 
associated reactivity can be, in principle, unique and intrinsic to each treatment. The methodological 
consequence of this is clear, and applies as well to our DG example: the difference in the donation levels 
across treatments (the output variable of interest net of the baseline or control) can not  thus be 
automatically assumed to be an accurate representation of what would have happened if the treatment of 
interest had been administered in the absense of reactivity.  
 
To sum up, a variation in the script needed to modify a standard DG in order to carry a treatment (as, e.g., 
when introducing a normative cue in a modified DG) is likely to carry with itself a new bundle of reactive 
phenomena. If this reactivity is of the malignant sort, i.e., if it carries behavioral effects onto our output 
variable of interest, and, if we think it is idyosyncratic (i.e., if we think it depends on the particular script 
we are enacting), then we may not have any obvious means to know what would be the effect of our 
treatment variable, net of reactivity.   
  
And yet, in the case of the DG, a significant difference in means between a standard DG (baseline) and a 
modified DG (treatment) is routinely presented in the relevant literature as proof of the effect on 
donations of whatever modification in the game. It should be noted that this implies that this difference in 
means can be interpreted as representing the effect of the introduction of the normative cue (the 
treatment) on donation levels, net of reactivity. However, as we have shown, this operation rests on 
endorsing at least one of the assumptions below: 
 
9 It should be noted that malignant idiosyncratic reactivity threatens not only external validity, but also,  
internal validity. Regarding external validity, the existence of reactive effects that can not be substracted 
away via a control group, undoubtedly poses problems to the extrapolation of results from the lab to non 
experimental conditions. The problem, however, is also one of external validity: proper causal 
identification through isolation is not possible in the presence of malignant idiosyncratic reactivity, and 




a. There is no reactivity involved either in the standard DG or on its modified version. 
b. Whatever reactivity there is, it is of the benign sort for both the standard DG and its modified 
version. 
c. If there is malignant reactivity on the DG or its modified version, this malignant reactivity is 
behaviorally equivalent in its impact on the variable output of interest (the level of donations), 
i.e., it is not idysincratic to the treatment.  
 
While any of the above assumptions can in principle be true for any given experiment, they cannot be 
assumed to hold generally across all social scientific settings, especially in cases in which we have reason 
to think that some forms of reactivity are likely, as in the case of  the DG and related games. Our 
framework shows why it is necessary to justify or discuss each of these assumptions  in every instance, 
and for each intervention, when presenting social scientific experimental results.  
 
Note that the case in which reactivity is both malignant and idiosyncratic is the truly challenging one, for 
what we call here malignant reactivity can otherwise be routinely treated through the use of control 
groups, as it normally is. Our goal here is to provide an account of reactivity that can clarify  why these 
situations can happen (and why they cannot be solved by the standard practice of having control groups). 
Our aim here is theoretical and conceptual rather than stritctly practical, meaning that we try to provide 
the definitions and distinctions that can be of help to further research aiming at systematically articulating 
what concrete experimental settings tend to bring about these problems. Though our aim is not here to 
provide a guide that identifies the concrete conditions under which reactivity can be either malignant or 
malignant and idosyncratic, we can hypothesize that there are a number of experimental situations where 
we can suspect that we are in this predicament. In particular, the DG can provide some cues regarding 
some of the scenarios that can make reactivity of the malignant idyosincratic kind more likely to emerge.  
 
The DG provides an example of a setting where we have a game that, having very little structure, 
produces very different results depending on the introduction of different cues or variations in the context. 
Put differently, the interpretation of the DG’s “meaning” seems to depend on minute context variation. 
We can tentatively hypothesize that scenarios where results are very “sensitive” to slight changes in the 
experimental script might also be candidates for being scenarios where slight changes in the script can 
bring about strong changes in the part of the behavior that is properly “reactive”. In these cases, we might 
suspect that the reactive behavior might not be the same across the treatment and the control groups, 
provided that we think that the sensitivity of the design affects, not only the behavior in the treatment’s 
causal path, but also, the part of the behavior that is properly “reactive”.  
 
As discussed in the introduction, the DG is a game in which, by construction, monetary incentives in the 
game do not dominate behavior (needless to say, if they did, the DG results would be incredibly boring, 
with zero donations across the board, irrespective of the particular designs). It seems to us that the DG 
exemplifies one of the obvious costs of abandoning dominance as a methodological precept: when 
economic incentives do not dominate the game, there is room for other considerations, including 
“reactive” ones, to affect the behavior of the participants in an experiment. But abandoning the principle 
of dominance is necessary if economists are interested in studying social behavior that relates to 
normative or ethical motivations, for the study of these through monetary incentives is done, precisely, by 
weighing monetary incentives against these other social (e.g, purely normative) considerations. In this 
sense, economists, once they have abandoned dominance as a guiding precept, have had to deal with 
reactivity as much as their experimental colleagues in other social sciences.  
 
The framework developed here thus seems to provide a promising route to finding out what makes results 
like those of the DG and similar games, particulary  debatable. We restrict our analysis to the conceptual 
and theoretical clarification of the phenomenon through an interventionist framework, rather than devote 
this piece to the particular methodological analysis of a given design. We contend, however, that our 








In social scientific experiments, the putative causes tested by the interventions come embedded in 
experimental scripts, rather than in pills, and thus operate through mental causation and social meaning, 
where this meaning is interpreted holistically. Experimental scripts embodying the treatment often give 
rise to some type of reactivity, whereby subjects modify their behavior as a result of some characteristics 
of the intervention, other than those related to the variable of interest. Whether this reactivity is suspected 
to be benign (if it does not have an effect on the relevant dependent variable) or malignant (if it does) will 
depend on the way those particular experimental scripts are processed and conceived by subjects. 
Moreover, this reactivity can, sometimes, be unique to each intervention, and thus, inseparable from each 
experimental script when the difference in outcomes between the control and the treatment group cannot 
guarantee that results are net of reactivity related input.  
 
When we contrast the output of the treatment intervention with the control intervention (as in a modified 
DG versus a standard DG) in order to draw causal conclusions, we are implicitly assuming that the 
reactivity generated by each experimental script is benign or that, if it is malignant, it is equivalent across 
treatments (i.e., not  idiosyncratic). While any of these assumptions may be true for any given 
intervention, they may not always hold jointlyin all cases.  By stressing the need to specify the conditions 
under which these assumptions can hold, our analysis aims to contribute to the debate over the limits of 
social scientific experimentation and specifically, about the validity of causal inferences generated by 
social experiments like the DG.  
 
 
Ultimately, our intuitions about reactivity  hinge upon, but also affect one’s methodological position in 
the debate regarding the powers and the limits of social scientific experimentation. Indeed, while 
reactivity is traditionally considered by some a problem that can be either prevented by the use of control 
groups, or accounted for in the interpretation of results, it has represented for others a definitive obstacle 
to the mere possibility of investigating the social world  experimentally (Harré and Secord, 1971). A 
tension has traditionally existed between two seemingly irreconcilable views on the relationship between 
experimentation and the issue of reactivity: the experiment seen as the best environment to create the type 
of control that is needed to separate behavior into some of its relevant causal components, and. the view 
that experimentation is severely hindered by the fact that all social reality, including the experimental site 
is a thick, layered environment charged with social meaning, where that social meaning can only be 
interpreted holistically. Here we try to show that although reactivity is very likely a constitutive part of 
social experimentation, it is often benign. When it is not, it is often solvable through the standard practice 
of including a control group. Yet, we have also shown that when reactivity is not benign and is 
idiosyncratic, then it does pose problems to the inferential import of experiments. We have offered a 
conceptual framework to understand reactivity and argue that elucidating this concept provides a useful 
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